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COMMENTARY ON "THE POSSIBILITY OF GOD"
James Patrick Downey

Clement Dore has offered a demonstration that God is possible. This is important because
the Ontological Argument shows that if God is possible, it is necessarily true that God
exists. Dore's demonstration parallels Descartes's Meditation V argument: (roughly) God
by definition has all perfections; but (Dore proposes) possible existence is a perfection;
therefore, God is possible. However, Leibniz recognized that Descartes's argument is
incomplete, omitting proof that the concept of God is consistent. Dore's demonstration
fails for just this reason. Dore's defense misses this objection. If the concept of God is
consistent, that directly establishes that God is possible, making assumptions about perfections irrelevant.

Leibniz wrote that
... certain philosophers, ancient and modem, have constructed a
demonstration of God that is extremely imperfect. It must be, they say,
that I have an idea of God, or of a perfect being, since I think of him
and we cannot think without having ideas; now the idea of this being
includes all perfections and since existence is one of these perfections
it follows that he exists. But I reply, inasmuch as we often think of
impossible chimeras, for example of the highest degree of swiftness,
of the greatest number, of the meeting of the conchoid with its base or
determinant, such reasoning is not sufficient. It is therefore in this sense
that we can say that there are true and false ideas according as the thing
which is in question is possible or not. And it is when he is assured of
the possibility of a thing, that one can boast of having an idea of it.
Therefore, the aforesaid argument proves that God exists, if he is possible. This is in fact an excellent privilege of the divine nature, to have
need only of a possibility or an essence in order to actually exist ... I
Leibniz attempted to supplement the ontological argument with a demonstration
that God is possible. Unfortunately, it depends upon questionable suppositions
concerning the concept of a perfection, and upon the questionable assumption
that if a concept is not analytically inconsistent it follows that it is not inconsistent.
However, Leibniz did recognize that the fundamental issue in the ontological
argument is the consistency of the concept of God, which is the question of the
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possibility of God's existence. The ontological argument shows that necessarily
if God is possible, then God exists, but the proof that God is possible is lacking.
Recently, Clement Dore has offered a demonstration that God is possible. 2
Dore's proof is modeled after Descartes's Meditation V argument. Here is the
demonstration, which Dore calls A2:
(l) The concept of God is the concept of a supremely perfect being.
(2) The concept of logical possibility is the concept of a perfection

relative to God.
So,
(3) the concept of God stands to the concept of logical possibility as,
e.g., the concept of a square stands to the concept of a figure which
has more sides than three, i.e., it is a conceptual truth that God is
logically possible.

Hence,
(4) God really is a logically possible being. (p. 304)

(1) is usually held to be true by definition. (2) is supposed to parallel Descartes's
premise that existence is a perfection. Accordingly, (2) might be subjected to
criticisms similar to the traditional ones against Descartes. Some might argue
that possible existence is not a genuine predicate, or perhaps not a perfection,
a property that adds to the greatness of a thing.3
However, even if (2) could be adequately defended, A2 still would not prove
that God is possible. It suffers from the same defect Leibniz's remarks find in
Descartes's demonstration.
Descartes's thought is that the concept of God logically includes the property
of existence, just as the concept of a mountain logically includes the property
of being conjoined with a valley-more accurately, just as the concept of an
upward slope logically includes the property of being conjoined with a downward
slope-Dr, just as the concept of a triangle logically includes the property of
having three angles equal to two right angles.
However, that a property P is logically included in a concept C does not entail
that C is consistent, or such that it is logically possible that there exists an object
of C. It is true that the concept of the greatest number logically includes the
property of being greater than two, but it is not logically possible that the greatest
number exists. The concept of the greatest number is not consistent.
But, suppose the property in question is possible existence. If possible existence
is logically included in the concept of an individual a, does this not establish
that it is a conceptual truth that a is possible? No, for consider the concept of
Arthur, the supremely perfect being that is F and not-F for some property F. If
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possible existence is a perfection, then it is logically included in the concept of
Al1hur, since that concept includes all perfections. Nevertheless, it does not
follow that it is a conceptual truth that Arthur is possible. That Arthur is possible
cannot be any sort of truth. Since the concept of Arthur is not consistent there
can be no such being.
Leibniz points out that determining the consistency of the concept of God is
logically distinct from determining that it necessarily includes some property,
and he argues that Descartes's demonstration omits proof that the concept of
God is consistent.
Since A2 differs from Descartes's demonstration only in that it substitutes the
property of possible existence for the property of existence, even if it demonstrates
that possible existence is logically included in the concept of God it omits proof
that the concept of God is consistent. Therefore, A2 does not prove that it is
logically possible that God exists.4
Dore's defense focuses on establishing that the conclusion of A2 is undeniably
that God is really possible, rather than merely (the conditional claim Dore calls
<1» that if God exists then he is possible. I would say that if the concept of God
is consistent, then the conclusion that God is really possible is true. However,
the proof of the antecedent is missing. And, nothing in Dore's line of defense
helps prove that the concept of God is consistent.
Dore's first strategy adds the assumption that" ... it is a conceptual truth
that God is possible entails the claim that it is because of the concept of possibility
and the concept of God (and not some other being) that the sentence 'God is
possible' expresses a truth.", which apparently is to follow from the assumption
that ". . . it is the mark of a conceptual truth-expressing sentence that its being
truth-expressing is explicable in terms of its expressing precisely the concepts
which it expresses." (p. 305)
However, even if these assumed entailments were correct, they would offer
no refutation of the Leibnizian objection to A2. Whether or not the proposition
that God is possible entails these things if it is a conceptual truth does not bear
on the objection that A2 does not establish that it is a conceptual truth since A2
does not demonstrate the consistency of the concept.
Moreover, emphasizing that A2 determines possible existence to be logically
included in the concept of God precisely by virtue of the concept of God's
induding all perfections and the concept ofiogical possibility's being the concept
of a perfection, rather than by virtue of any other assumption something or any
other concepts, is of no help against the Leibnizian objection. For, the same can
be said with respect to our determination that possible existence is logically
induded in the concept of Arthur. It gets included precisely because the concept
of Arthur includes all perfections and the concept of logical possibility is the
concept of a perfection, and not because of any other assumptions. 5

THE POSSIBILITY OF GOD

205

Dore's second strategy, which argues that (4), 'God is really a logically
possible being', is not analytic, is of no help against Leibniz's objection, either.
Whether (4) would be an analytic or a synthetic truth is beside the point of the
Leibnizian objection that A2 does not establish (4)'s truth since it does not
establish that the concept of God is consistent.
I conclude that A2 has not been defended against Leibniz's objection to
Descartes, and I do not see how it can be. Dore, himself, is to be commended
for advancing a demonstration that God is possible. 6 Any such attempt is a step
forward in a central challenge for rational theism, and merits the close attention
of all concerned with these matters. 7
University of Virginia

NOTES
1. Leibniz, G., Discourse On Metaphysics, Open Court Publishing Company, reprint edition, 1973,
pp. 40-41.
2. Dore, Clement, "The Possibility of God," Faith And Philosophy, Vol. 1, no. 3, July 1984. All
page references are to this text.
3. Dore speaks of the concept of logical possibility as the concept of a perfection relative to God.
The alleged perfection, itself, [ take to be a certain property, being logically possible, which for
convenience I shall refer to as the property of possible existence.
4. Of course, if the concept of God is consistent (broadly logically consistent, to employ the
contemporary term for the distinction from mere formal consistency), that directly establishes that
God is possible, making the assumption that possible existence is a perfection, and indeed the whole
procedure of A 2 , superfluous.
5. Nor would Dore's treatment of logical truths in connection with his 'possible super-centaur'
case reveal any differences between the concepts of God and Arthur that might save A2 . 'Arthur'
is indeed similar to 'possible super-centaur' in that both concepts are artificially constructed with
possibility built in. Dore might suggest, for this and other reasons, that both concepts lead only to
the trivial logical truth that if any such things exist they are possible. It is certainly necessarily true
of any concept that if its object exists its object is possible. However, artificially constructed and
leading to logical truths or not, it is the case that if these concepts are consistent their objects
necessarily exist, and that unless they are consistent their objects cannot possibly exist. The same
holds for the concept of God in the ontological argument. 'Arthur' is explicitly inconsistent. 'Possible
super-centaur', as well as other Gaunilo-type concepts, are not consistent since their objects cannot
be necessary beings. Whether the concept of God is consistent is not clear. (l take up the difficulties
which necessity in the concept of God creates for both the traditional Gaunilo response to Anselm
and for a modem version of Gaunilo directed at modal ontological arguments, in my paper "A
Primordial Reply To Modern Gaunilo's," Religious Studies, vol. 22, no. I, March 1986.)
6. Dore has also offered a different demonstration of God's possibility in his book Theism. [t seems
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not more successful than A 2, and offers no help for A2 against Le:ibniz.
7. I am grateful to James Cargile for reading earlier drafts of this paper and making valuable
suggestions.

